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Abstract
We study data poisoning attacks in the online setting where training items arrive
sequentially, and the attacker may perturb the current item to manipulate online
learning. Importantly, the attacker has no knowledge of future training items nor
the data generating distribution. We formulate online data poisoning attack as a
stochastic optimal control problem, and solve it with model predictive control and
deep reinforcement learning. We also upper bound the suboptimality suffered by
the attacker for not knowing the data generating distribution. Experiments validate
our control approach in generating near-optimal attacks on both supervised and
unsupervised learning tasks.
1 Problem Statement
Protecting machine learning from adversarial attacks is of paramount importance [18, 35, 40]. To
do so one much first understand various types of adversarial attacks. Data poisoning is a type of
attack where an attacker contaminates the training data in order to force a nefarious model on the
learner [9, 11, 19, 24, 29, 38]. Prior work on data poisoning focused almost exclusively on the
batch setting, where the attacker poisons a batch training set, and then the victim learns from the
batch [7, 10, 29, 30, 33, 38]. However, the batch setting misses the threats posed by the attacker
on sequential learners. For example, in e-commerce applications user-generated data arrives at the
learner sequentially. Such applications are particularly susceptible to poisoning attacks, because it is
relatively easy for the attacker to manipulate data items before they arrive at the learner. Furthermore,
the attacker may observe the effect of previous poisoning on the learner and adaptively decides how to
poison next. This adaptivity makes online data poisoning a potentially more severe threat compared
to its batch counterpart.
This paper presents a principled study of online data poisoning attacks. Our key contribution is
an optimal control formulation of such attacks. We provide theoretical analysis to show that the
attacker can attack near-optimally even without full knowledge of the underlying data generating
distribution. We then propose two practical attack algorithms—one based on traditional model-based
optimal control, and the other based on deep reinforcement learning—and show that they achieve
near-optimal attack performance in synthetic and real-data experiments. Taken together, this paper
builds a foundation for future studies of defense against online data poisoning.
The online data poisoning problem in this paper is shown in Figure 1. There are three entities: a
stochastic environment, a sequential learning victim, and the online attacker. In the absence of
attacks, at time t the environment draws a training data point zt ∈ Z i.i.d. from a time-invariant
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Figure 1: Online data poisoning attack diagram. The attacker observes the training samples {zt} and
the learner’s model {θt} in an online fashion, and injects poisoned samples {at}.
distribution P : zt
i.i.d.∼ P. For example, zt can be a feature-label pair zt := (xt, yt) in supervised
learning or just the features zt := xt in unsupervised learning. The victim maintains a model θt ∈ Θ.
Upon receiving zt, the victim performs one step of the sequential update defined by the function f :
θt+1 = f(θt, zt), (1)
For example, f can be gradient descent f(θt, zt) := θt − η∇`(θt, zt) under learner loss ` and step
size η. We now introduce the attacker by defining its knowledge, allowed actions, and goals:
• The attacker has knowledge of the victim’s update function f , the victim’s initial model θ0, data
z0:t generated by the environment so far, and optionally n “pre-attack” data points z−n:−1
i.i.d.∼ P .
However, at time t the attacker does not have the clairvoyant knowledge of future data points
zt+1, zt+2, . . ., nor does it have the knowledge of the environment distribution P .
• The attacker can perform only one type of action: once the environment draws a data point zt,
the attacker perturbs the data point into a potentially different point at ∈ Z . The attacker incurs
a perturbation cost gper(zt,at), which reflects the price to attack. For example, gper(zt,at) :=
‖at − zt‖p if Z is endowed with an appropriate p-norm. The attacker then gives at to the victim,
who proceeds with model update (1) using at instead of zt.
• The attacker’s goal, informally, is to force the victim’s learned models θt to satisfy certain nefarious
properties at each step while paying a small cumulative perturbation cost. These “nefarious
properties” (rather the inability to achieve them) are captured by a nefarious cost gnef(θ). It
can encode a variety of attack goals considered in the literature such as: (i) targeted attack
gnef(θ) := ‖θ − θ†‖ to drive the learned model toward an attacker-defined target model θ† (the
dagger is a mnemonic for attack); (ii) aversion attack gnef(θ) := −‖θ − θˆ‖ (note the sign) to push
the learned model away from a good model θˆ, such as the one estimated from pre-attack data; (iii)
backdoor attack gnef(θ) := `(θ, z†), in which the goal is to plant a backdoor such that the learned
model behaves unexpectedly on special examples z† [10, 24, 33]. To balance nefarious properties
with perturbation cost, the attacker defines a running cost g at time t:
g(θt, zt,at) := λgnef(θt) + gper(zt,at), (2)
where λ is a weight chosen by the attacker to balance the two. The attacker desires small cumulative
running costs, which is the topic of Section 3.
2 Related Work
Data poisoning attacks have been studied against a wide range of learning systems. However, this
body of prior work has almost exclusively focused on the offline or batch settings, where the attacker
observes and can poison the whole training set or an entire batch of samples at once, respectively.
In contrast, our paper focuses on the online setting, where the attacker has to act multiple times
and sequentially during training. Examples of offline or batch poisoning attacks against SVM
include [7, 9, 38]. Such attacks are generalized into a bilevel optimization framework against general
offline learners with a convex objective function in [29]. A variety of attacks against other learners
have been developed, including neural networks [21, 30], autoregressive models [2, 11], linear and
stochastic bandits [19, 27], collaborative filtering [24], and models for sentiment analysis [31].
There is an intermediate attack setting between offline and online, which we call clairvoyant online
attacks, where the attacker performs actions sequentially but has full knowledge of all future input
data zt+1, zt+2, . . . Examples include heuristic attacks against SVM learning from data streams [9]
and binary classification with an online gradient descent learner [37]. Our paper focuses instead on
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the perhaps more realistic setting where the attacker has no knowledge of the future data stream.
More broadly, our paper advocates for a general optimal control viewpoint that is not restricted to
specific learners such as SVM.
The parallel line of work studying online teaching also considers the sequential control problem
of machine learners, where the goal is to choose a sequence of training examples that accelerates
learning [23, 26]. However, [26] solves the problem using a greedy heuristic that we show in Section 6
performs poorly compared to our optimal control approach. On the other hand, [23] finds optimal
teaching sequences but is restricted to an ordinary linear regression learner.
The problem of optimal feedback control in the presence of noise, uncertain disturbances, or uncertain
dynamics has been an area of study for the better part of the past century. Major subfields include
stochastic control, when disturbances are stochastic in nature [3, 22], adaptive control, when unknown
parameters must be learned in an online fashion [4, 32], and robust control, when a single controller
is designed to control a family of systems within some uncertainty set [34, 39].
More recently, these classical problems have been revisited in the context of modern statistics, with
the goal of obtaining tight sample complexity bounds. Examples include unknown dynamics [13],
adversarial dynamics [1], adversarial cost [12] or unknown dynamics and cost [16]. These works
typically restrict their attention to linear systems with quadratic or convex losses, which is a common
and often reasonable assumption for control systems. However, for our problem of interest described
in Section 1, the system dynamics (1) are the learner’s dynamics, which are nonlinear for all cases of
practical interest, including simple cases like gradient descent. In the sections that follow, we develop
tools, algorithms, and analysis for handling this more general nonlinear setting.
3 An Optimal Control Formulation
We now precisely define the notion of optimal online data poisoning attacks. To do so, we cast
the online data poisoning attack setting in Section 1 as a Markov Decision Process (MDP)M =
(S,A, T, g, γ, s0) explained below.
• The state st at time t is the stacked vector st := [θt, zt]T consisting of the victim’s current model
θt and the incoming environment data point zt. The state space is S := Θ×Z .
• The attacker’s action is the perturbed training point, i.e. at ∈ Z . The action space is A := Z .
• From the attacker’s perspective, the state transition probability T : S × A → ∆S , where ∆S
is the probability simplex over S, describes the conditional probability on the next state given
current state and attack action. Specifically, T (st+1 | st,at) = T ([θt+1, zt+1]T | st,at) =
Pr(f(θt,at) = θt+1) · P (zt+1). For concreteness, in this paper, we assume that the victim
learning update f is deterministic, and thus the stochasticity is solely in the zt+1 component
inside st+1, which has a marginal distribution P , i.e.
T
(
[f(θt,at), zt+1]
T
∣∣ st,at) = P (zt+1). (3)
• The quality of control at time t is specified by the running cost g(θt, zt,at) in (2), to be minimized.
From now on, we overload the notation and write the running cost equivalently as g(st,at). Note
that this is the opposite of the reward maximization setup commonly seen in reinforcement learning.
• We present online data poisoning attack with an infinite time horizon (the finite horizon case
is similar but omitted due to space). We introduce a discounting factor γ ∈ (0, 1) to define a
discounted cumulative cost.
• The initial probability µ0 : S → ∆S is the probability distribution of the initial state s0. In
particular, we assume that the initial model θ0 is fixed while the first data point z0 is sampled from
P , i.e. µ0(θ0, z0) = P (z0).
A policy is a function φ : S → A that the attacker uses to choose the attack action at := φ(st) =
φ([θt, zt]
T) based on the current victim model θt and the current environment input zt. The value
V φM(s) of a state s is the expected discounted cumulative cost starting at s and following policy φ:
V φM(s) := EM
∞∑
t=0
γtg(st, φ(st))
∣∣∣∣
s0=s
(4)
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where the expectation is over the transition probability T . Overall, the attacker wants to perform
optimal control over the MDP, that is, to find an optimal control policy φ?M that minimizes the
expected value at the initial state. Define the attacker’s objective as JM(φ) := Es∼µ0 V
φ
M(s) , and
the attacker’s optimal attack policy as φ?M = arg minφ JM(φ).
Fortunately for the victim, the attacker cannot directly solve this optimal attack problem because it
does not know the environment data distribution P and thus cannot evaluate the expectation. However,
as we show next, the attacker can use model predictive control to approximately and incrementally
solve for the optimal attack policy while it gathers information about P as the attack happens.
4 Practical Attack Algorithms via Model Predictive Control
The key obstacle that prevents the attacker from obtaining an optimal attack is the unknown data
distribution P . However, the attacker can build an increasingly accurate empirical distribution
Pˆt from z0:t and optionally the pre-attack data sampled from P . Specifically, at time t with Pˆt
in place of P and with the model θt in place of θ0, the attacker can construct a surrogate MDP
Mˆt = (S,A, Tˆt, g, γ, µˆt), solve for the optimal policy φ?Mˆt = arg minφ JMˆt(φ) on Mˆt, and use
φ?Mˆt to perform a one-step attack: at = φ
?
Mˆt(st).
As time t goes on, the attacker repeats the process of estimating φ?Mˆt and applying the one-step attack
φ?Mˆt(st). This repeated procedure of (re)-planning ahead but only executing one action is called
Model Predictive Control (MPC) [8, 28], and is widely used across the automotive, aerospace, and
petrochemical industries, to name a few. At each time step t, MPC would plan a sequence of attacks
using the surrogate model (in our case Pˆt instead of P ), apply the first attack at, update Pˆ , and repeat.
This allows the controller to continually adapt without committing to an inaccurate model.
Next, we present two algorithms that practically solve the surrogate MDP, one based on model-based
planning and the other based on model-free reinforcement learning.
4.1 Algorithm NLP: Planning with Nonlinear Programming
In the NLP algorithm, the attacker further approximates the surrogate objective as JMˆt(φ) ≈
EPˆt
[∑t+h−1
τ=t γ
τ−tg(sτ , φ(sτ ))
]
≈∑t+h−1τ=t γτ−tg(sτ ,aτ )∣∣∣
zt:t+h−1
. The first approximation trun-
cates at h steps after t, making it a finite-horizon control problem. The second approximation does
two things: (i) It replaces the expectation by one sampled trajectory of the future input sequence,
i.e. zt:t+h−1 ∼ Pˆt. It is of course possible to use the average of multiple trajectories to better
approximate the expectation, though empirically we found that one trajectory is sufficient. (ii) Instead
of optimizing over a policy φ, it locally searches for the action sequence at:t+h−1 ∈ Z . The attacker
now solves the following optimization problem at every time t:
min
at:t+h−1
t+h−1∑
τ=t
γτ−tg(sτ ,aτ ) (5)
s.t. sτ+1 = [f(sτ ,aτ ), zτ ]T,∀τ = t, ..., t+ h− 1
zt:t+h−1 and st fixed and given.
Let a?t:t+h−1 be a solution. The NLP algorithm defines φ
?
Mˆt
(st) := a
?
t , then moves on to t+ 1. The
resulting attack problem in general has a nonlinear objective stemming from gnef() and gper() in (2),
and nonconvex equality constraints stemming from the victim’s learning rule f() in (1). Nonetheless,
the attacker can solve modest-sized problems using modern nonlinear programming solvers such as
IPOPT [36].
4.2 Algorithm DDPG: Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient
Instead of truncating and sampling to approximate the surrogate attack problem with a nonlinear
program, one can directly solve for the optimal parametrized policy φ using reinforcement learning.
In this paper, we utilize deep deterministic policy gradient (DDPG) [25] to handle a continuous
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action space. DDPG learns a deterministic policy with an actor-critic framework. Roughly speaking,
it simultaneously learns an actor network µ(s) parametrized by θµ and a critic network Q(s, a)
parametrized by θQ. The actor network represents the currently learned policy while the critic
network estimate the action-value function of the current policy, whose functional gradient guides
the actor network to improve its policy. Specifically, the policy gradient can be written as: ∇θµJ =
Es∼ρµ [∇aQ(s, µ(s)|θQ)∇θµµ(s|θµ)] in which the expectation is taken over ρµ, the discounted
state visitation distribution for the current policy µ. The critic network is updated using Temporal-
Difference (TD) learning. We refer the reader to the original paper [25] for a more detailed discussion
of this algorithm and other deep learning implementation details.
There are two advantages of this policy learning approach to the direct approach NLP. Firstly, it
actually learns a policy which can generalize to more than one step of attack. Secondly, it is a
model-free method and doesn’t require knowledge of the analytical form of the system dynamic f ,
which is necessary for the direct approach. Therefore, DDPG also applies to the black-box attack
setting, where the learner’s dynamic f is unknown. To demonstrate the generalizability of the learned
policy, in our experiments described later, we only allow the DDPG method to train once at the
beginning of the attack on the surrogate MDP Mˆ0 based on (θ0, z0) and the pre-attack data z−n:−1.
The learned policy φMˆ0 is then applied to all later attack rounds without retraining.
5 Theoretical Analysis
The fundamental statistical limit to a realistic attacker is its lack of knowledge on the environment data
distribution P . An idealized attacker with knowledge of P can find the optimal control policy φ?M
that achieves the optimal attack objective JM. In contrast, a realistic attacker only has an estimated
Pˆ , hence an estimated state transition Tˆ , and ultimately an estimated MDP Mˆ = (S,A, Tˆ , g, γ, µˆ0).
The realistic attacker will find an optimal policy with respect to its estimated MDP Mˆ: φ?Mˆ =
arg minφ JMˆ(φ), but φ
?
Mˆ is in general suboptimal with respect to the true MDP M. We are
interested in the optimality gap V
φ?Mˆ
M (s)− V φ
?
M
M (s). Note both are evaluated on the true MDP.
We present a theoretical analysis relating the optimality gap to the quality of estimated Pˆ . Our
analysis is a natural extension to the Simulation Lemma in tabular reinforcement learning [20] and
that of [5]. We assume that both Z and Θ are compact, and the running cost g is continuous and thus
bounded on its compact domain. WLOG, we assume g ∈ [0, Cmax]. It is easy to see that then the
range of value is bounded: V ∈ [0, Cmax1−γ ] for bothM, Mˆ , any policy, and any state. Note the value
function (4) satisfies the Bellman equation: V φM(s) = g(s, φ(s)) + γ ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V
φ
M(s
′).
Proposition 5.1. Consider two MDPsM,Mˆ that differ only in state transition, induced by P and
Pˆ , respectively. Assume that ‖Pˆ − P‖1 :=
∫
Z
∣∣Pˆ (z)− P (z)∣∣dz ≤ ε. Let φ?M denote the optimal
policy onM and φ?Mˆ the optimal policy on Mˆ. Then, sups∈S V
φ?Mˆ
M (s)− V φ
?
M
M (s) ≤ γCmaxε(1−γ)2 .
Proposition 5.1 implies that optimality gap is at most linear in ε := ‖Pˆ − P‖1. Classic Results on
Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) suggest that the L1 distance between P and the kernel density
estimator Pˆn based on n samples converges to zero asymptotically in a rate of O(n−s/d+2s) for some
constant s (e.g. Theorem 9 in [17]).
In the experiment section below, the environment data stream is generated from a uniform distribution
on a finite data set, in which case P is a multinomial distribution. Under this special setting, we
are able to provide a finite-sample bound of order O(n−1/2) that matches with the best achievable
asymptotic rate above, i.e. as s→∞.
Theorem 5.2. Consider an MDPM induced by a multinomial distribution P with support cardinality
N , and a surrogate MDP Mˆ induced by the empirical distribution Pˆ on n i.i.d. samples, i.e. Pˆ (i) =
1
n
∑n
j=1 Ixj=i. Denote φ
?
M the optimal policy onM and φ?Mˆ the optimal policy on Mˆ. Then, with
probability at least 1− δ, we have sups∈S V
φ?Mˆ
M (s)−V φ
?
M
M (s) ≤ 2γCmax(1−γ)2
√
1
2n ln
2N+1
δ = O(n
−1/2).
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6 Experiments
In this section, we empirically evaluate our attack algorithms NLP and DDPG in Section 4 against
several baselines on synthetic and real data. As an empirical measure of attack efficacy, we compare
the attack methods by their empirical discounted cumulative cost J˜(t) :=
∑t
τ=0 γ
τg(θτ , zτ ,aτ ),
where the attack actions aτ are chosen by each method. Note that J˜(t) is computed on the actual
instantiation of the environment data stream z0, . . . , zt. Better attack methods tend to have smaller
J˜(t). We compare our algorithms with the following Baseline Attackers:
Null Attack: This is the baseline without attack, namely aNullt = zt for all t. We expect the null
attack to form an upper bound on any attack method’s empirical discounted cumulative cost J˜(t).
Greedy Attack: The greedy strategy is applied widely as a practical heuristic in solving sequential
decision problems ([23, 26]). For our problem at time step t the greedy attacker uses a time-invariant
attack policy which minimizes the current step’s running cost g. Specifically, the greedy attack
policy can be written as aGreedyt = arg mina g(θt, zt,a). If we instantiate gnef = ‖θt − θ†‖22 for a
target model θ† and gper = 0, we exactly recover the algorithm in [26]. Both null attack and greedy
attack can be viewed as time-invariant policies that do not utilize the information in Pˆt.
Clairvoyant Attack: A clairvoyant attacker is an idealized attacker who knows the time horizon
T and the whole data sequence z0:T−1 upfront. In most realistic online data poisoning settings an
attacker only know z0:t at time t. Therefore, the clairvoyant attacker has strictly more information,
and we expect it to form a lower bound on realistic attack methods in terms of J˜(t). The clairvoyant
attacker solves a finite time-horizon optimal control problem, equivalent to the formulation in
[37] but without terminal cost: mina0:T−1
∑T−1
t=0 γ
tg(θt, zt,at) subject to θ0 given, z0:T−1 given
(clairvoyant), and θt+1 = f(θt,at), t = 0 . . . T − 1.
6.1 Poisoning Task Specification
To specify a poisoning task is to define the victim learner f in (1) and the attacker’s running cost g
in (2). We evaluate all attacks on two types of victim learners: online logistic regression, a supervised
learning algorithm, and online soft k-means clustering, an unsupervised learning algorithm.
Online logistic regression: Online logistic regression performs a binary classification task. The
incoming data takes the form of zt = (xt, yt), where xt ∈ Rd is the feature vector and yt ∈ {−1, 1}
is the binary label. In the experiments, we focus on attacking the feature part of the data, as is
done in a number of prior works [21, 29, 37]. The learner’s update rule is one step of gradient
descent on the log likelihood with step size η: f (θ, (x, y)) = θ + η yx
1+exp(yθTx)
. The attacker wants
to force the victim learner to stay close to a target parameter θ†, i.e. this is a targeted attack. The
attacker’s cost function g is a weighted sum of two terms: the nefarious cost gnef is the negative cosine
similarity between the victim’s parameter and the target parameter, and the perturbation cost gper is
the L2 distance between the perturbed feature vector and the clean one, i.e. g (θt, (xt, y), (x′t, y)) =
−λ cos (θt, θ†)+ ‖x′t − xt‖2. Recall cos(a, b) := aTb‖a‖‖b‖ .
Online soft k-means: Online soft k-means performs a k-means clustering task. The incoming
data contains only the feature vector, i.e. zt = xt. Its only difference from traditional k-means
is that instead of updating only the centroid closest to the current data point, it updates all the
centroids but the updates are weighted by their squared distances to the current data point using
the softmax function [6]. Specifically, the learner’s update rule is one step of soft k-means update
with step size η on all centroids, i.e. f(θ(j),a) = θ(j) + ηrj(a − θ(j)), j = 1, . . . , k, where r =
softmax
(−‖a−θ(1)‖2, . . . ,−‖a−θ(k)‖2). Recall softmax(x1, . . . , xk) := [ ex1∑k
j e
xj
, . . . , e
xk∑k
j e
xj
]T
.
Similar to online logistic regression, we consider a targeted attack objective. The attacker wants to
force the learned centroids to each stay close to the corresponding target centroid θ†(j). The attacker’s
cost function g is a weighted sum of two terms: the nefarious cost function gnef is the sum of the
squared distance between each of the victim’s centroid and the corresponding target centroid, and the
perturbation cost gper is the `2 distance between the perturbed feature vector and the clean one, i.e.
g(θt, zt,at) = λ
∑k
j=1 ‖f(θ,a)(j) − θ†
(j)‖2 + ‖at − zt‖2.
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Figure 2: Synthetic data experiments. In (b)-(f), transparent blue and red dots indicate clean positive
and negative data point zt at time step t, solid dots indicate attacker-perturbed data point at, vertical
lines in between indicate the amount of perturbation.
6.2 Synthetic Data Experiments
We first show a synthetic data experiment where the attack policy can be visualized. The environment
is a mixture of two 1D Gaussian: P = 12N(θ
(1), 1) + 12N(θ
(2), 1) with θ(1) = −1 and θ(2) = +1.
The victim learner is online soft k-means with k = 2 and initial parameter θ(1)0 = −2, θ(2)0 = +2.
The attack target is θ†(1) = −3 and θ†(2) = +3, namely the opposite of how the victim’s parameters
should move. We set the learning rate η = 0.01, cost regularizer λ = 10, discounting factor γ = 0.99,
evaluation length T = 500 and look-ahead horizon for MPC h = 100. For attack methods that
requires solving a nonlinear program, including GREEDY, NLP and Clairvoyant, we use the JuMP
modeling language [15] and the IPOPT interior-point solver [36]. Following the above specification,
we run each attack method on the same data stream and compare their behavior.
Results: Figure 2a shows the empirical discounted cumulative cost J˜(t) as the attacks go on. On
this toy example, the null attack baseline achieves J˜(T ) = 3643 at T = 500. The greedy attacker is
only slight more effective at J˜(T ) = 3372. NLP and DDPG (curve largely overlap and hidden under
NLP) achieve 1265 and 1267, respectively, almost matching Clairvoyant’s 1256. As expected, the
null and clairvoyant attacks form upper and lower bounds on J˜(t).
Figure 2b-f shows the victim’s θt trajectory as attacks go on. Without attack (null), θt converges
to the true parameter −1 and +1. The greedy attack only perturbs each data point slightly, failing
to force θt toward attack targets. This failure is due to its greedy nature: the immediate cost gt at
each round is indeed minimized, but not enough to move the model parameters close to the target
parameters. In contrast, NLP and DDPG (trajectory similar to NLP, not shown) exhibit a different
strategy in the earlier rounds. They inject larger perturbations to the data points and sacrifice larger
immediate costs in order to drive the victim’s model parameters quickly towards the target. In later
rounds they only need to stabilize the victim’s parameters near the target with smaller per-step cost.
6.3 Real Data Experiments
In the real data experiments, we run each attack method on 10 data sets across two victim learners.
Datasets: We use 5 datasets for online logistic regression: Banknote Authentication (with feature
dimension d = 4), Breast Cancer (d = 9), Cardiotocography (d = 25), Sonar (d = 60), and MNIST
1 vs. 7 (d = 784), and 5 datasets for online k-means clustering: User Knowledge (d = 6, k = 2),
Breast Cancer (d = 10, k = 2), Seeds (d = 8, k = 3), posture (d = 11, k = 5), MNIST 1 vs.
7 (d = 784, k = 2). All datasets except for MNIST can be found in the UCI Machine Learning
Repository [14]. Note that two datasets, Breast Cancer and MNIST, are shared across both tasks.
Preprocessing: To reduce the running time, for datasets with dimensionality d > 30, we reduce the
dimension to 30 via PCA projection. Then, all datasets are normalized so that each feature has mean
0 and variance 1. Each dataset is then turned into a data stream by random sampling. Specifically,
each training data point zt is sampled uniformly from the dataset with replacement.
Experiment Setup: In order to demonstrate the general applicability of our methods, we draw
both the victim’s initial model θ0 and the attacker’s target θ† at random from a standard Gaussian
7
0 100 200 300
t
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 80
CLAIRVOYANT
(a) Banknote
0 100 200 300
t
3000
2000
1000
0
1000
2000
3000
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 80
CLAIRVOYANT
(b) Breast
0 100 200 300
t
2000
1000
0
1000
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 20
CLAIRVOYANT
(c) CTG
0 100 200 300
t
3000
2000
1000
0
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 20
CLAIRVOYANT
(d) Sonar
0 100 200 300
t
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 20
CLAIRVOYANT
(e) MNIST 1 vs. 7
0 100 200 300
t
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 80
CLAIRVOYANT
(f) Knowledge
0 100 200 300
t
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 80
CLAIRVOYANT
(g) Breast
0 100 200 300
t
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 80
CLAIRVOYANT
(h) Seeds
0 100 200 300
t
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 80
CLAIRVOYANT
(i) Posture
0 100 200 300
t
0
20000
40000
60000
J(
t)
NULL
GREEDY
DDPG
NLP, h = 80
CLAIRVOYANT
(j) MNIST 1 vs. 7
Figure 3: The empirical discounted cumulative reward J˜(t) for the five attack methods across 10 real
datasets. The first row is on online logistic regression and the second row is on online k-means. Note
that g(·) for online logistic regression can be negative, and thus the J˜(t) curve can be decreasing.
distribution of the appropriate dimension, for both online logistic regression and online k-means in all
10 datasets. Across all datasets, we use the following hyperparameters: η = 0.01, γ = 0.99, T = 300.
For online logistic regression λ = 100 while for online k-means λ = 10.
For DDPG attacker we only perform policy learning at the beginning to obtain φMˆ0 ; the learned
policy is then fixed and used to perform all the attack actions in later rounds. In order to give it a fair
chance, we give it a pre-attack dataset z−n:−1 of size n = 1000. For the sake of fair comparisons,
we give the same pre-attack dataset to NLP as well. For NLP attack we set the look-ahead horizon
h such that the total runtime to perform T = 300 attacks does not exceed the DDPG training time,
which is 24 hours on an Intel Core i7-6800K CPU 3.40GHz with 12 cores. This results in h = 20
for online logistic regression on CTG, Sonar and MNIST, and h = 80 in all other experiments.
Results: The experiment results are shown in figure 3. Interestingly, several consistent patterns
emerge from the experiments: The clairvoyant attacker consistently achieves the lowest cumulative
cost J˜(T ) across all 10 datasets. This is not surprising, as the clairvoyant attacker has extra infor-
mation of the future. The NLP attack achieves clairvoyant-matching performance on all 7 datasets
in which it is given a large enough look-ahead horizon, i.e. h = 80. DDPG follows closely next to
MPC and Clairvoyant on most of the datasets, indicating that the pre-trained policy φMˆ0 can achieve
reasonable attack performance in most cases. On the 3 datasets where h = 20 for NLP, DDPG
exceeds the short-sighted NLP, indicating that when the computational resource is limiting, DDPG
has an advantage by avoiding the iterative retraining that NLP cannot bypass. GREEDY does not do
well on any of the 10 datasets, achieving only a slightly lower cost than the NULL baseline. This
matches our observations in the synthetic experiment.
Each of the attack methods also exhibits strategic behavioral patterns similar to what we observe in
the synthetic experiment. In particular, the optimal-control based methods NLP and DDPG sacrifice
larger immediate costs in earlier rounds in order to achieve smaller attack costs in later rounds. This
is especially obvious in the online logistic regression plots 3b-e, where the cumulative costs J˜(t) rise
dramatically in the first 50 rounds, becoming higher than the cost of NULL and GREEDY around that
time. This early sacrifice pays off after t = 50 where the cumulative cost starts to fall much faster.
In 3c-e, however, the short-sighted NLP (with h = 20) fails to fully pick up this long-term strategy,
and exhibits a behavior close to an interpolation of greedy and optimal. This is not surprising, as
NLP with horizon h = 1 is indeed equivalent to the GREEDY method. Thus, there is a spectrum of
methods between GREEDY and NLP that can achieve various levels of performance with different
computational costs.
8
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we formulated online poisoning attacks as a stochastic optimal control problem. We
proposed two attack algorithms: a model-based planning approach and a model-free reinforcement
learning approach, and showed that both are able to achieve near clairvoyant-levels of performance.
We also provided analysis to characterize the optimality gap between a realistic attacker with no
knowledge of P and a clairvoyant attacker that knows P in advance.
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8 Appendix
These proofs follow the technique in Nan Jiang’s Statistical Reinforcement Learning lecture notes
(https://nanjiang.cs.illinois.edu/cs598/).
8.1 Proof of theorem 5.1
Proof. For any policy φ and state s ∈ S, we have
|V φMˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)| (6)
Bellman
= |g(s, φ(s)) + γ ETˆ (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)− g(s, φ(s))− γ ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φM(s′)|
= γ|ETˆ (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)− ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φM(s′)|
= γ|ETˆ (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)− ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′) + ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)− ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φM(s′)|
tri.≤ γ|ETˆ (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)− ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)|+ γ|ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)− ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φM(s′)|
extremal≤ γ|ETˆ (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)− ET (s′|s,φ(s)) V φMˆ(s
′)|+ γ sup
s∈S
|V φMˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)|
= γ
∣∣∣〈Tˆ (·|s, φ(s))− T (·|s, φ(s)), V φMˆ(·)〉∣∣∣+ γ sup
s∈S
|V φMˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)|
const.
= γ
∣∣∣∣〈Tˆ (·|s, φ(s))− T (·|s, φ(s)), V φMˆ(·)− Cmax2(1− γ)
〉∣∣∣∣+ γ sup
s∈S
|V φMˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)|
Hölder≤ γ‖Tˆ (·|s, φ(s))− T (·|s, φ(s))‖1 sup
s∈S
∣∣∣∣V φMˆ(s)− Cmax2(1− γ)
∣∣∣∣+ γ sup
s∈S
|V φMˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)|
range
≤ γ‖Tˆ (·|s, φ(s))− T (·|s, φ(s))‖1 Cmax
2(1− γ) + γ sups∈S |V
φ
Mˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)|
= γ‖Pˆ − P‖1 Cmax
2(1− γ) + γ sups∈S |V
φ
Mˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)|
≤ γCmaxε
2(1− γ) + γ sups∈S |V
φ
Mˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)|.
Since this holds for all s ∈ S, we can also take the supremum on the LHS, which yields
sup
s∈S
|V φMˆ(s)− V
φ
M(s)| ≤
γCmaxε
2(1− γ)2 . (7)
Now, for any s ∈ S,
V
φ?Mˆ
M (s)− V φ
?
M
M (s) = V
φ?Mˆ
M (s)− V φ
?
M
Mˆ (s) + V
φ?M
Mˆ (s)− V
φ?M
M (s) (8)
opt.
≤ V φ
?
Mˆ
M (s)−
(
V
φ?Mˆ
Mˆ (s)
)
+ V
φ?M
Mˆ (s)− V
φ?M
M (s) (9)
(7)
≤ γCmaxε
2(1− γ)2 +
γCmaxε
2(1− γ)2 (10)
=
γCmaxε
(1− γ)2 . (11)
This completes the proof.
8.2 Proof of theorem 5.2
Proof. We first want to establish an `1 concentration bound for multinomial distribution. Observe
that for any vector v ∈ RN ,
‖v‖1 = max
u∈{−1,1}N
uTv. (12)
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The plan is to prove concentration for each uTv first, and then union bound over all u to obtain the `1
error bound. Observe that uTPˆ is the average of n i.i.d. random variables uTexi with range [−1, 1].
Then, by Hoeffding’s Inequality, with probability at least 1− δ/2N , we have
uT(Pˆ − P ) ≤ 2
√
1
2n
ln
2N+1
δ
. (13)
Then, we can apply union bound across all u ∈ {−1, 1}Nand get that, with probability at least 1− δ,
‖Pˆ − P‖1 = max
u
uT(Pˆ − P ) ≤ 2
√
1
2n
ln
2N+1
δ
(14)
Substituting this quantity into Lemma 5.1 yields the desired result.
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